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Credit or Debit? Unauthorized Use and
Consumer Liability Under Federal Consumer
Protection Legislation
The payment system had a certain romance when its
standard instrument could be stolen by pirates, placed in a
wooden chest, and buried, but our contemporary commercial culture has made the subject much more mundane.'
INTRODUCTION
Debit cards are the fastest growing method of payment in America. 2 As
an alternative to carrying cash and bulky checkbooks, consumers are electing
to use debit cards as a preferred way to pay for many goods and services.3 In
1995, Visa brand debit cards alone initiated nearly 100 transactions every
second of every day.4 By 1997, sixty million debit cards were in circulation,
a 40% increase from 1995. 5 Consumer confidence in using debit cards is
increasing because many debit cards now carry the familiar Visa or
MasterCard logo.6 If the current trend continues, banking experts predict that
by the year 2000 more than two-thirds of American households will possess
a debit card.7
Although debit cards may closely resemble credit cards in appearance,
consumer liability for unauthorized use is not similar and the payment
transaction initiated through use is very different.' In response to the
increasing use of debit card products, consumer protection issues concerning
liability for unauthorized use have been raised, new legislation has been
1.

Robert D. Cooter &Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocationfor Consumer

Payments, 66 TEx. L. REV. 63, 123 (1987).

2. Visa Expands Debit CardConsumerEducation With NationalConsumers League,
PR NEWSWIRE, July 27, 1998.
3. See Michelle Clayton, The Casefor Debit Cards,AMERICA'S COMMUNrrY BANKER,

Mar. 1998, at 22.

4. VISA-U.S. DEBrr &CASH PRODUCrs (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http://www.visa.com
/cgi-bin/vee/pd/debit/main.html?2+0>.
5. BMETR BUSINESS BUREAU, Debit Cards Could Be Costly, Warns Better Business
Bureau (visited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.sddt.comreports/97reports/bank97_09_08/DN97
9_08_tf.html>.

6. See id. (stating that some debit cards carry the Visa or MasterCard logo).

7. A bill to amend the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to safeguard consumers in
connection with the utilization of certain debit cards. H.R. 445, 106th Cong. (1999).
8.

Visa Expands Debit CardConsumerEducation With NationalConsumers League,

PR NEWSWIRE, July 27, 1998.
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introduced to Congress and an extremely lucrative debit card market has
prospered. 9
Sections I through IV of this comment provide an overview of the federal
Truth in Lending Act'0 and of the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act" in
relation to consumer liability issues concerning the use of credit and debit
cards. Section V briefly discusses self-regulatory industry efforts that are
pertinent to unauthorized use. Section VI outlines proposed federal legislation, which, if enacted, may make a consumer's liability for the unauthorized
use of a debit card similar to a consumer's liability for the unauthorized use
of a credit card.
Section VII contains a broad discussion of whether existing debit card
law should be amended by Congress to provide consumers with liability
protection similar to existing credit card law. The discussion offers three
general reasons to support the conclusion that the framework under existing
federal debit card law, concerning consumer liability for unauthorized use,
should not be changed to resemble the federal credit card law. First, existing
federal law governing the unauthorized use of a credit card may provide an
unreasonable amount of time in which consumers can enjoy protection against
liability from unauthorized use; amending debit card law to resemble such is
unwarranted. Second, even if liability protection under federal credit card law
is justified, it should not be the same under federal debit card law because the
nature of and mentality toward the debit card transaction is not the same. Put
simply, paying with a debit card is more similar to using a check as a method
of payment. Third, to the extent that existing federal debit card law is
amended to resemble the unauthorized use liability framework under federal
credit card law, the effect of the additional consumer protection legislation
will be extremely minimal. The discussion ends with a focus on additional
industry considerations, reemphasizing that major industry participants have
already implemented policies that extend liability protection beyond that
offered under existing federal debit card law. In short, industry regulations
afford consumers more than adequate additional protection against liability
resulting from unauthorized use.
This comment briefly concludes that the enactment of federal legislation
further limiting a consumer's liability for unauthorized debit card transactions
is unnecessary. Amending the liability framework applicable to debit cards
will likely provide no additional protection to responsible consumers, and
9. David A. Balto, Can the Promise of Debit Cardsbe Fulfilled?, 53 BUS. LAW. 1093,
1098, 1102, 1105 (May 1998).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665b (1994 & Supp. 111996).

11.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994).
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ultimately, it may encourage irresponsible account maintenance. Finally,
adequate industry-initiated safeguards are in place. Therefore, consumers are
already provided with sufficient protection against liability that may result
from an unauthorized debit card transaction.
I. HISTORY OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

& REGULATION Z

On May 22, 1967, the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) was
passed by Congress. 2 The CCPA contained five titles when it was originally
enacted. 3 Title I of the CCPA was named Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure.' 4
This title is officially known as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 5
Primary purposes behind enacting the Truth in Lending Act were "to
assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and
avoid the uniformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against
inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices."' 6 To implement
the TILA,the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board")
is authorized to promulgate regulations in accordance with the TILA 7 These
12. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
See also 7 KENNETH M. LAPINE, BANKING LAW, Ch. 150-156, § 152-4 (1998).
13. LAPINE, supra note 12, § 152-4.
14. Id.
15. Act ofMay 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title l,§ 101, 82 Stat. 146, TILA § 101,
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1994). The TILA was not fully effective until July 1,1969. Id.Since
the TILA became effective, it has been amended on eight occasions. See LAPINE, supra note 12,
§ 152-6-10.
16. TILA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
Truth in Lending Act was enacted to provide consumers meaningful
information about their credit transactions; act requires uniform
disclosure of credit terms, including annual percentage rates, imposes
restrictions on credit advertising, provides right of recission where
personal residence used as collateral, prohibits mailing of unsolicited
credit cards, and establishes procedures for handling billing disputes.
LAPINE, supra note 12, § 152-4. In 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson endorsed the TILA when stating,
"The Truth-in-Lending Act of 1967 would strengthen the efficiency of our credit markets,
without restraining them. It would allow the cost of credit to be fully determined by informed
borrowers and responsible lenders. It would permit the volume of consumer credit to be fully
responsive to the growing needs, ability to pay, and aspirations of the American Consumer."
H.R. Doc. No. 57 (1967), cited inLAPINE, supra note 12, § 152-5, 6.
17. TILA § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this
subchapter. [Tihese regulations may contain such classifications,
differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such
adjustments and expectations for any class of transactions, as in the
judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes
of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to
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8
regulations have been compiled and designated as Regulation Z ("Reg. Z").
In promulgating Reg. Z, the Board has "adopted many provisions of the
act without change, further amplified some provisions, and not dealt at all with
set forth
other provisions."' 9 To help creditors understand the requirements
20
Interpretation.
Staff
Official
an
issues
Board
the
Z,
Reg.
under
The Board's interpretation of Reg. Z can be extremely useful to
creditors, especially since it provides many examples of how the various
regulations apply. 2' However, creditors should not solely rely on the Board's
interpretation. The interpretation should be used only as a compliance guide
22
because liability extends to those who fail to comply with the TILA. To
avoid liability under the TILA, a creditor should always examine the Board's
interpretations as compared to the most recently amended version of the
TWLA. The TWA, however, does provide a safe harbor for creditors who rely
in good faith on the Board's interpretation.23 If the requirements of this safe
harbor provision are satisfied, a creditor will not be subjected to civil or
criminal liability for noncompliance with the TLA. 24

1. CARDHOLDER LIABILITY UNDER THE TLA

& REG. Z

A. UNAUTHORIZED USE

A primary objective of the TILA is "to protect the consumer against
'
inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." To further this
objective, the TLA provides liability safeguards to consumers' who maintain
facilitate compliance therewith.

Id. See also LAPINE, supra note 12, § 152-11.

18. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (1998).
19. LAPINE, supra note 12, § 152-12.
20. Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. 1(1998).
21. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I, 12(b)-3 (1998) (listing steps a card issuer may
take to conduct a reasonable investigation upon a cardholder. providing notice of an
unauthorized credit card use or billing error).
22. TILA § 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1994).
23. TILA § 130(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1994), added by Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-495, § 406, 88 Stat. 1518. This section also applies when a creditor, in good faith,
erroneously relies on Reg. Z because the TILA has been amended and this change has yet to be
consistently reflected by the Board through issuing an amended Reg. Z. Id. See also, LAPINE,
supra note 12, § 152-15.
24. TILA § 130(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(0 (1994).
25. TILA § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994). The Truth in Lending Act is to be
liberally construed in favor of the consumer. Davis v. Werne, 673 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir.
1982).
26. Under the TILA, a "consumer" is a natural person to whom credit is extended
"primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." TILA § 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h)
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open end credit plans27 or charge accounts with creditors.2" The common
means used to initiate an extension of credit is the "credit card", which is

defined under the TLA as "any card, plate, coupon book or other credit

device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or
services on credit."2' 9 The TILA refers to the person to whom the credit card
is issued as the "cardholder ' " and the person sending or providing the card as
the "card issuer.
"31

Section 133 of the TILA governs the liability of a cardholder with
respect to the unauthorized use of a credit card. 32 The term "unauthorized

(1994). See also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(1 1) (1998) (defining "consumer" as including
a "cardholder").
27. An "open end credit plan" is defined under the TILA as a:
plan under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated
transactions, which prescribes the terms of such transactions, and which
provides for a finance charge that may be computed from time to time on
the outstanding unpaid balance. A credit plan which is an open end credit
plan within the meaning of the preceding sentence is an open end credit
plan even if information is verified from time to time.
TILA § 103(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1994). See also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (1998).
28. The TILA defines "creditor", in part, as a person who:
both'(1) regularly extends.., consumer credit which is payable in four
installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be
required; and (2) is the person to whom the debt from the credit
transaction is initially payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness
or, if there is no such evidence of indebtedness, by agreement.
TILA § 103(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1994). See also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i)
(1998).
29. TILA § 103(k), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k) (1994); see also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(15) (1998).
30. TILA § 103(m), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(m) (1994); see also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(8) (1998).
31. TILA § 103(n), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(n) (1994); see also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(7) (1998).
32. TILA § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). This section specifically applies to the
unauthorized use of a "credit card". It is common, however, for creditors to send cardholders
convenience checks. A convenience check is not processed through Visa or MasterCard, rather,
it functions as a negotiable instrument and is sent by a depositary bank for collection. See
generally infra notes 204-207. A convenience check will eventually be presented for settlement
to the bank on which it was drawn, which will be a bank where the creditor holds an account.
Id. If a presented convenience check is not timely returned for exceeding a cardholder's credit
line, the amount of the draft will be paid, and this amount will be debited to drawer-cardholder's
account. Id. Assume, however, that the convenience check was stolen from mail belonging to
the cardholder and it was subsequently cashed containing a forged signature. Since it is
impractical for large credit card companies to timely review the signature on every convenience
check that is presented for settlement, a convenience check with a forged signature will usually
be paid. In this scenario, the creditor will not become aware of the forgery until the cardholder
provides notice. This would generally occur when the cardholder receives a periodic statement
that reflects an extension of credit in the amount paid on the forged convenience check. Since

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

use" is defined under the TILA as "use of a credit card by a person other than
'33 A
the cardholder who does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority.
typical unauthorized charge occurs when'a cardholder loses a credit card or
becomes victim to credit card theft and a third party possessor uses the card
to make a purchase. If a card's use is unauthorized, the TILA affords the
cardholder extensive protection.34

§ 133 of the TILA specifically limits the liability of a cardholder for the unauthorized use of a
credit card, the question becomes: Is a convenience check a credit card? Under § 103(k) of the
TILA, a credit card means "any card, plate, coupon book or other credit device existing for the
purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit." Although a convenience
check is not generally perceived as a credit card, it seemingly falls under the § 103(k) definition
because it is an "other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor,
or services on credit." Thus, the liability limitations under § 133 of the TILA apply. However,
there is a discrepancy between § 133 of the TILA and its implementing counterpart found under
Reg. Z at 12 C.F.R. § 226.12. Similar to § 133 of the TILA, § 226.12 of Reg. Z limits a
cardholder's liability for an unauthorized use of a credit card. However, § 226.2(15) of Reg.
Z defines a credit card as meaning "any card plate, coupon book, or other single credit device
that may be used from time to time to obtain credit." (emphasis added). Since a convenience
check does not fit the physical description of a credit card under § 226.2(15) and because a
convenience check can only be used once, not from time to time, it fails to fall under this
definition of a credit card.
33. TILA § 103(o), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (1994). For an insightful discussion of when
a charge is authorized because the charge was made with apparent authority, see Towers World
Airways Inc. v. PHH Aviation System Inc., 933 F.2d 174 (2nd Cir. 1991). In defining apparent
authority, the court in Towers states: "the cardholder, as principal, creates apparent authority
through words or conduct that, reasonably interpreted by a third party from whom the card
bearer makes purchases, indicate that the card user acts with the cardholder's consent." Id. at
177. Voluntarily giving another access to a credit card or account number has rendered the
cardholder liable for all subsequent charges in some states. Draiman v. American Express
Travel, 892 F.Supp 1096, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See also Stieger v. Chevy Chase Savings
Bank, 666 A.2d 479,484 (D.C. 1995) (stating that "[t]o a merchant, voluntary relinquishment
combined with the matching of a signature is generally a reasonable indication of apparent
authority to utilize the credit card."). In contrast, other states have viewed this conduct as an
important factor, yet in the context "of other conduct and circumstances, especially industry
custom, prior course of dealing and the presence or absence of characteristics that tend to
distinguish authorized from unauthorized uses." Draiman, 895 F. Supp. at 1099. For an indepth analysis of the unauthorized use of a credit card, see Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Credit
Cards-Authorized and Unauthorized Use, 13 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 233 (1994).
34. See TILA § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994) (imposing numerous requirements upon
a card issuer prior to holding a cardholder liable for any amount incurred for an unauthorized
use). Although most sections of the TILA apply exclusively to situations involving "consumer"
credit, it should be noted that for the limited purposes of the rules on issuance of credit cards
and liability for unauthorized use, "a cardholder includes any person, (including organizations)
to whom a card is issued for any purpose, including a business." Official Staff Interpretations
to Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, 12(b)(1) (1998) (emphasis added). However, if a card
issuer has issued 10 or more cards for the use of employees of an organization and an agreement
to liability exists between the card issuer and the organization, then liability is governed under
the agreement and § 133 of the TILA is not applicable. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(5) (1998).
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A cardholder is not liable for any amount resulting from an unauthorized
use unless the following conditions have been met:35 (1) the card used in the
transaction was an accepted credit card,36 (2) the card issuer disclosed
adequate notice to the cardholder of potential liability,37 (3) the card issuer has
disclosed and provided the cardholder with a means by which the cardholder
can notify the card issuer if a card is lost or stolen, 38 and (4) the card issuer has
provided the cardholder with a method whereby the cardholder can be
identified as an authorized user.39 Furthermore, a cardholder is not liable for
any unauthorized use occurring after the card issuer has received notice that
an unauthorized use of the credit card has occurred or may occur as the result
of loss, theft, or otherwise.' If all of the conditions are met and an unauthorized use occurs prior to the card issuer receiving notice, a cardholder is liable
for no more than $50 of the unauthorized use. 4' As added protection, if a card
issuer chooses to judicially challenge a cardholder's claim of unauthorized
use, the burden of proof falls on the issuer to establish that the charge was in
fact authorized.4 2
Aside from limiting a cardholder's liability, the scope of the liability
protection offered under the TILA broadly extends to the unauthorized use of
a "credit card", and thus, the type of consumer credit plan is irrelevant. 4 For
instance, by applying generally to a credit card, the liability protection offered
under the act exists regardless of whether or not the credit plan is revolving
or otherwise. In short, "consumers need not discern what form of credit card
may have been issued to understand quickly the card's level of risk and
ultimate liability." 44
Moreover, the TILA's $50 liability limit to cardholders who incur an
unauthorized use is not contingent upon the cardholder reporting a credit card
lost or stolen, upon promptly reporting suspected unauthorized use, or upon

35. TILA § 133(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (1994).
36. TILA § 133(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(A) (1994). An accepted credit card
is "any credit card which the cardholder has requested and received or has signed or has used,
or authorized another to use, for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services
on credit." TILA § 103(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(1) (1994).
37. TILA § 133(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(C) (1994).
38. TILA § 133(a)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(D) (1994).
39. TILA § 133(a)(1)(F), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(F) (1994).
40. TILA § 133(a)(1)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(E) (1994).
41. TILA § 133(a)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (1994).
42.
43.
44.

TILA § 133(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(b) (1994).
TILA § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994).
Balto, supra note 9, at 1103.
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time in general.4" In fact, the cardholder who negligently fails to realize that
their credit card is missing or to review an inflated monthly statement will still
be entitled to the $50 liability limitation under the TILA. Since the TILA fails
to impose a time limit in which consumers must act in order to receive

protection under § 133, the burden of preventing fraud falls heavily upon the
creditor. This does not mean every alleged unauthorized charge will be
waived to the extent that it exceeds $50. Rather, the card issuer must conduct

a reasonable investigation upon notice of an alleged unauthorized charge and
must comply with § 133 liability limitations only when procured evidence

reasonably favors the cardholder's claim.46
B. BILLING ERRORS

In addition to providing cardholders with protection against unauthorized
use, cardholders are also protected, if certain conditions are satisfied, from

liability that results from a billing error.47 Under Reg. Z48, a billing error may

45. Section 133 under the TILA fails to limit a cardholder's time to claim an
unauthorized use. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). Moreover, Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b),
(Liability of cardholderfor unauthorized use), the Board's implementation of § 133, does not
limit a cardholder's time to make an unauthorized claim.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). Although neither § 133 under the TILA nor § 226.12(b)
under Reg. Z expressly requires the card issuer to conduct a reasonable investigation, §
226.13(f) (Proceduresif different billing erroror no billing error occurred), does require a
reasonable investigation in that it states: "If, after conducting a reasonable investigation..."
(emphasis added). In direct support, the Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.12(b)-3 (1998), states: "If a card issuer seeks to impose liability when a claim of
unauthorized use is made by a cardholder, the card issuer must conduct a reasonable
investigation of the claim." (emphasis added). A reasonable investigation may include:
i. Reviewing the types or amounts of purchases made in relation to the
cardholder's previous purchasing pattern.
ii. Reviewing where the purchases were delivered in relation to the
cardholder's residence or place of business.
iii. Reviewing where the purchases were made in relation to where the
cardholder resides or has normally shopped.
iv. Comparing any signature on credit slips for the purchases to the
signature of the cardholder or an authorized user in the card issuer's
records, including credit slips.
v. Requesting documentation to assist in the verification of a claim.
vi. Requesting a written, signed statement from the cardholder or
authorized user.
vii. Requesting a copy of a police report, if one was filed.
viii. Requesting information regarding the cardholder's knowledge of the
person who allegedly used the card or of that person's authority to do so.
Id.
47. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (1998).
48. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1998).
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constitute any of the following circumstances: (1) a reflection on a billing
statement of an unauthorized charge,49 (2) a reflection of an extension of credit

that fails to adequately identify transactions,50 (3) a reflection of a charge for

property or services that were never accepted by a cardholder, or were not
delivered to the cardholder in accordance with an agreement made in relation
to the transaction,51 (4) failure by the card issuer to correctly reflect a payment

made by the cardholder or other credit owed to the cardholder's account,52 (5)
a reflection of a computational error,53 (6) a reflection of an extension of credit
in which the cardholder requests additional clarification or explanation,54 and
(7) failure to send a cardholder's periodic statement to a last known address
as long as the card issuer has received written notice of the cardholder's last
known address no sooner than twenty days prior to the end of the billing
cycle.55

49. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(1) (1998). Due to overlapping language, confusion can arise
when § 226.13(a)(l) is compared to § 226.12(b), Liability of cardholderforunauthorized use.
Depending on the time a consumer makes a claim, both sections apply to situations involving
the unauthorized use of a credit card. Section 226.13(a)(1) applies when the cardholder notifies
the creditor of an unauthorized use, reflected on their periodic statement, as long as the
cardholder provides this notice in writing and within sixty days of when the statement
containing the possible billing error was transmitted by the creditor. If a cardholder fails to
report the suspected unauthorized charge within sixty days of when the statement was
transmitted, § 226.13 is inapplicable because timely notification by the cardholder is a condition
precedent to claiming a "billing error." Id. § 226.13(b)(1). However, under § 226.12(b), which
speaks directly to a cardholder's liability for the unauthorized use of a credit card, there is no
time limit in which notification must be provided. Thus this section is applicable when a
cardholder's claim of unauthorized use fails to constitute a billing error. In support, the Official
Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(3)-3, states: "The liability protections
afforded to cardholders in § 226.12 do not depend upon the cardholder's following the error
resolution procedures in § 226.13. For example, the written notification and time limit
requirements of § 226.13 do not affect the section 226.12 protections." Consider, for instance,
a situation where a cardholder finds out his bookkeeper has embezzled money by using the
cardholder's credit card to make unauthorized purchases and has successfully covered-up the
scam for over 2 years. In this scenario, the cardholder is still liable for no more than $50 under
Reg. Z, § 226.12(b). Lastly, if a cardholder disputes a charge as unauthorized and the creditor
thereafter keeps the alleged unauthorized charge(s) on the cardholder's account, irrespective of
a legitimate justification (e.g. creditor conducts reasonable investigation and concludes that
charges were authorized), at this time an alleged violation of the TILA occurs and the statute
of limitations to bring suit within one year of the alleged violation would begin to run pursuant
to § 133(e) of the TILA.
50. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(2) (1998).
51. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(3) (1998).
52. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(4) (1998).
53. 12C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(5) (1998).
54. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(6) (1998).
55. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(7) (1998).
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A creditor is obligated to conduct a reasonable investigation upon being
57
notified in writing 6 from a cardholder that a billing error has occurred. Reg.
Z excuses the creditor from this obligation if the cardholder fails to report the
billing error within sixty days of when the statement reflecting the alleged
error was transmitted.58 If the cardholder provides the creditor with timely
notice, then the creditor must issue a provisional credit equal to the amount of
the disputed charge, 59 investigate the cardholder's claim' and resolve the
6
dispute by the sooner of two full billing cycles or ninety days. " Upon

56. Written notification of a billing error should enable the creditor to identify the
consumer's name and account number. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b)(2) (1998). Such notification
should also indicate reasons why the consumer believes a billing error exists. 12 C.F.R. §
226.13(b)(3) (1998). Upon receiving written notice of a billing error, a creditor must provide
the consumer with written acknowledgment or resolution within 30 days of receiving a billingerror notice. Id. § 226.13(c) (1998).
57. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b) (1998). For actions that may be included in conducting a
reasonable investigation, see Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, supra note 46, § 226.12(b)-3
(1998).
58. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b)(1) (1998).
59. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(d)(1) (1998) (a cardholder's right to withhold the disputed
amount and collection actions by the creditor are prohibited).
60. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(0 (1998); see also Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, supra
note 46, § 226.12(b)-3.

61. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(c)(2) (1998). When a cardholder claims that an unauthorized
use occurred, yet fails to put notice of such in writing or notice is received after the sixty day
time frame, billing errorprocedures do not apply. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b) (1998). In this
case, the cardholder is claiming a non-billing-error unauthorized use (because notice was either
not in writing or not timely) and, if liability is to be imposed on the cardholder, the card issuer
must still conduct a reasonable investigation to establish whether the charge was in fact
authorized. See Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, supra note 46, § 226.12(b)-3. Thus, the
cardholder's claim of unauthorized use would be governed under Reg. Z, § 226.12 (Special
Credit Card Provisions). The Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, § 226.12(b)-3, expressly
states that a reasonable investigation is necessary before a card issuer imposes any liability
when a claim of unauthorized use is made, but neither the Official Staff Commentary nor 12
C.F.R. § 226.12 require a card issuer to complete the investigation within any time period, as
does 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(c)(2), which would apply if the claim of unauthorized use was timely
or in writing (i.e., if the claim was a billing error unauthorized use). The Official Staff
Commentary to Reg. Z provides steps that a card issuer may take to conduct a reasonable
investigation, regardless of whether the investigation is pursuant to a billing-error or nonbilling-error unauthorized use. See Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z., § 226.12(b)-3 (1998).
It is therefore assumed that the nature of a "reasonable investigation" is essentially the same
regardless of whether the claim is a billing-error unauthorized use or non-billing-error
unauthorized use. But can it be assumed that the omission of requiring a reasonable
investigation and time frame in 12 C.F.R. § 226.12, the section applicable to non-billing-error
unauthorized use, was intended to allow card issuers more time to complete a "reasonable
investigation"? At least two arguments can be made, both opposite in effect. First, the lack of
an expressed time frame regarding non-billing-error unauthorized use claims may mean that a
creditor who takes longer than the sooner of two full billing cycles or ninety days to complete
a "reasonable investigation" is technically not in violation under Reg. Z. Since a cardholder is
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concluding its investigation, 62 a creditor must either issue a permanent credit
equal to the amount erroneously reflected 63 or remove the provisional credit

in accordance with its findings."4 A creditor who removes the provisional

credit because it concludes that a billing error did not occur may appropriately
charge the cardholder's account interest on an amount equal to the provisional

credit. 65 Further, a creditor need not respond to a claim if the cardholder is
reasserting a claim that has already been resolved. 66 If the cardholder

not under a time restraint to report a non-billing-error unauthorized use, but is subject to a time
limit to report a billing-error unauthorized use, Congress may have intended to not impose a
time limit on card issuers regarding an investigation into non-billing-error unauthorized use
because it may take longer to conduct a "reasonable" investigation when a cardholder has an
unlimited amount of time in which to claim an unauthorized use. For instance, if a cardholder
timely reports a billing-error unauthorized use, it is possible for a card issuer to conduct a
"reasonable investigation" as articulated under § 226.12(b)-3 of the Official
Staff Commentary
to Reg. Z because the transaction is not older than three months and pertinent information is
usually available. On the other hand, if a cardholder is responding to a claim made two years
after the alleged non-billing-error unauthorized use, then a "reasonable" investigation may take
more than two full billing cycles because pertinent information will be more difficult to obtain.
Therefore, the lack of a time frame to complete a non-billing-error unauthorized use may have
been intended, and as long as a card issuer posts a provisional credit to the cardholder's account,
equal to the amount alleged to be unauthorized, taking more than two full billing cycles to
complete a "reasonable" investigation is necessary. Second, in the alternative, the argument can
be made that in spite of the fact that 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 and the Official Staff Commentary omit
a time limit in which a card issuer must conduct a "reasonable investigation", if liability is to
be imposed for non-billing-error unauthorized use claims, the two full billing cycle time limit
under 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(c)(2) was intended to apply. The Board's interpretation, in respect
to the reasonable investigation requirement, clearly fails to distinguish between billing-error and
non-billing-error unauthorized use, thus the billing-error time limit to conduct the investigation
may be applicable irrespective of whether the unauthorized use constitutes a billing error. Thus,
arguably, a reasonable investigation should never take longer than the sooner of two full billing
cycles or ninety days.
62. If a creditor concludes that the billing error asserted did not occur, then: 1) the
creditor must provide the consumer with an explanation of its findings, 2) if requested, provide
the consumer with documentary evidence of the consumer's indebtedness, 3) if a billing error
other than the one asserted occurred, the creditor must correct the error and credit the
consumer's account accordingly. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(f) (1998).
63. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(e)(1) (1998) (stating that a creditor must "[c]orrect the
billing error and credit the consumer's account with any disputed amount and related finance
or other charges, as applicable").
64. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g)(1) (1998) (stating that a creditor must promptly notify
the consumer "in writing of the time when payment is due and the portion of the disputed
amount and related finance or other charges that the consumer still owes").
65. Id.
66. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(h) (1998). However, if a consumer reasserts the same claim
before the expiration of 10 days from the date of resolution or the expiration of the contractual

grace period, whichever is longer, the creditor must: promptly report to relevant credit reporting
agencies that the amount is still in dispute, provide the consumer with notice of each credit
reporting agency that the creditor reports to, and promptly report subsequent resolution to each
person or agency to which the account has been reported. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g)(4) (1998).
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disagrees with a creditor's conclusion, or believes that the creditor failed to
conduct a reasonable investigation, the cardholder's recourse against the
creditor is confined to judicially pleading, pursuant to § 130 of the TILA,that
a violation has occurred. 67
C. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

A final protection granted to cardholders under Reg. Z is the right to
assert claims or defenses against the card issuer.' This right is not contingent
upon an unauthorized use or billing error, but rather it exists when "a person
who honors a credit card fails to resolve satisfactorily a dispute as to property
'69
or services purchased with the credit card in a consumer credit transaction."
A dispute may generally arise if a merchant fails to provide the cardholder
with property or services in accordance with the related sales contract.
However, before a cardholder can assert a claim or defense against the card
issuer the following conditions must be satisfied: 1) a good faith attempt has
70
been made by the cardholder to resolve the dispute with the merchant, 2) the
amount in dispute exceeds $50, and 3) the disputed transaction occurred in the
state in which the cardholder resides or within 100 miles of the cardholder's
current address. 7' If these conditions are met, and the cardholder could not
resolve the dispute with the merchant, then a cardholder may assert a claim
against the card issuer. Once a claim has been asserted, a card issuer cannot
require payment or impose a finance or any other fee on the amount in
dispute.7 2
I. HISTORY OF THE ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT & REGULATION E
Resulting from the "rapidly increasing volume of transactions involving
electronic fund transfers", 3 Congress ultimately passed Title XX of the Fin-

67. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(e) (1998) (stating that liability and enforcement under Reg.
Z exists pursuant to the TILA). See also, TILA § 112(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1611(3) (1994) (stating
that criminal liability exists for creditors who "willfully" and "knowingly" fail to comply with
the TILA).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1998).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(1) (1998).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(3)(i) (1998).
71. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(3)(ii) (1998).
72. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(1) (1998). "Section 226.12(c) merely preserves the
consumer's right to assert against the card issuer any claims or defenses that can be asserted
against the merchant. It does not determine what claims or defenses are valid as to the
merchant; this determination must be made under state or other applicable law." Official Staff
Commentary to Reg. Z, supra note 46, § 226.12(c)-2.
73. See S. Rep. No. 915,95th Cong. (1978), cited in8 KENNETH M. LAPINE, BANKING
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ancial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA).74
This legislation has been designated as Title IX of the Consumer Protection
Credit Act" and is officially known as the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
(EFTA).7 6 To implement the EFTA, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System is authorized to prescribe regulations in accordance with the
EFTA.77 These regulations are designated as Regulation E ("Reg. E").
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act establishes the "rights, liabilities, and
responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer. The primary
objective of this title, however, is the provision of individual consumer
rights. '79 An electronic fund transfer (EFT) is "any transfer of funds that is
initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer, or magnetic tape
for the purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing afinancialinstitution
to debit or credit an account."' (emphasis added). The EFTA applies only to
EFTs between accounts belonging to natural persons since the term "financial
institution" is defined as an institution that maintains "an account belonging
to a consumer"8 ' and the term "consumer" means "a natural person."8 "
However, the EFTA does not apply to business accounts held by consumers
because the term "account" relates to those accounts "established primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes." 3
An EFT does not include transactions that originate by "check, draft, or
similar paper instrument."' 4 EFTs may include, however, point-of-sale (POS)
transfers,85 automated teller machine (ATM) transactions, direct deposit or

LAW, Ch. 157-169, § 164-4.
74. Pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3741, 3728 (1978). See also, LAPINE, supra note 73,

§ 164-5.

75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (1994).
77. EFTA § 904(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(a) (1994).
78. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1998).
79. EFTA § 902(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (1994).
80. EFTA § 903(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1994).
81. EFTA § 903(8), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(8) (1994).
82. EFTA § 903(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(5) (1994). The EFTA would not be applicable
regarding an EFT between corporations. Id. See also LAPINE, supra note 73, § 164-7.
83. EFTA at § 903(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) (1994). The consumer's account must be
a demand deposit (checking account), a savings account or other asset account. Id.

84. EFTA § 903(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1994).
85. "P.O.S. debit card transactions generally take place at merchant locations, but also
include mail and telephone orders to purchase goods and services involving the use of a debit
card. Transactions at A.T.M.s, however, are not P.O.S. even though the A.T.M. may be in a
merchant location." Official Staff Commentary to Reg. E,Q. 11-11.5, cited in LAPINE, supra
note 73, § 164-4, n. 2.
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other automated clearing house (ACH) transfers, and transfers initiated by
telephone. 6

An increasingly popular way to initiate an EFT is through using a debit

8
card. 7 A debit card is used as an access device to initiate an EFT. Debit
8 9 With
cards may function as initiating either online or offline transactions.
ATM machines entering the national market in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the ATM card became the first commonly used access device that allowed
consumers to initiate online EFs.9' Upon entering a personal identification
number, a consumer using an ATM card can instantly and electronically
transfer funds.91 Online debit cards also include "cards that can be used at

online POS terminals [and] require the use of a personal identification number

(PIN) to initiate the transaction.'
On the other hand, offline debit cards are used to initiate offline
transactions.93 Offline debit cards resemble credit cards in many ways and the

94
initiated transaction does not result in an immediate transfer of funds.

Offline debit cards may contain the Visa or MasterCard logo and may not
require the use of a PIN." Similar to initiating a credit card transaction, the

86. EFTA § 903(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1994). However, any transfer of funds
initiated by way of a telephone conversation between a consumer and an employee of a financial
institution is not an EFT if it is not pursuant to a prearranged agreement that contemplates
recurring transfers. EFrA § 903(6)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6)(E) (1994).
87. "By the year 2000, two-thirds of American households will have a debit card. Debit
cards are expected to rival cash and checks as a form of payment. With the debit card, you are
using your own money, not the issuers money." NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE, Debit Cards:
Beyond Cash and Checks (visited Nov. 27, 1998)

<http://www.natlconsumersleague.org/debitbro.htm>.

88. As defined under the EFTA, the term "accepted card or other means of access"
means "a card, code, or other means of access to a consumer's account for the purpose of
initiating electronic fund transfers." EFTA § 903(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(l) (1994).
89. Balto, supra note 9. at 1093.
90. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TUL L. REV. 1177, 1233 (1998). In 1978 fewer than 14,000 ATMs were

installed in the U.S., whereas in 1998, over 110,000 ATMs will operate nationally. Roland E.

Brandel & Lee S. Adams, The Modernization of Regulation E, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE,
Jan./Feb. 1997, at 13.
91. THE BETTER BUSINESs BUREAU, Tips On... Using Debit Cards (visited Dec. 28,
1998) <http://www.bbb.orgllibrary/debitcard.html>.
92. Balto, supra note 9, at 1093-94.
93. THE BETrER BUSINESS BUREAU, Tips On... Using Debit Cards (visited Dec. 28,
1998) <http://www.bbb.orgllibrary/debitcard.html>.
94. Id.
95. BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, Debit Cards Could Be Costly, Warns Better Business
Bureau (visited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.sddt.com/reports/97reports/bank97_09_08/DN
97_09_08_tf.html>.
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customer is required to sign a sales slip instead of using a PIN." Similar to
using a check as a means of payment, the transaction does not immediately
result in debiting the consumer's checking account. The initiated transaction
is generally processed through a Visa or MasterCard network and the funds
may take a few days to clear or settle." Ultimately, the method of payment
initiated with an offline debit card functions more like the method of payment
initiated with a paper check. 98
Offline debit cards have raised consumer protection issues regarding
unauthorized use. 99 Since a debit card serves as a means to directly access a
consumer's account, an unauthorized user could easily convert all of the funds
held in the account.' ° Since many consumers do not realize their debit card
can be used without a PIN, the risks associated with losing the card could be
substantial.' O' Though debit cards may resemble credit cards in appearance,
the protection afforded under federal legislation, to consumers who use a debit
card as a method of payment, is much less than when a consumer uses a credit
card as a method of payment."
IV. CARDHOLDER LIABILITY UNDER THE EFTA AND REG. E
A. UNAUTHORIZED USE

Section 909 of the EFTA governs a consumer's liability for unauthorized
transfers."0 3 A consumer will not be liable for any amount resulting from an
96. TuE BETTER BUsINESS BUREAU, Tips On... Using Debit Cards (visited Dec. 28,
1998) <http://www.bbb.org/library/debitcard.html>.
97. Balto, supra note 9, at 1094, 1102-03.
98.

BETTER BusINEss BuREAU, Debit Cards Could Be Costly, Warns Better Business

Bureau (visited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.sddt.com/reports/97reports/bank97_09_08/DN
97_09_08_tf.html>.
99. Balto, supra note 9, at 1102. An unauthorized electronic fund transfer is defined
under the EFTA as "an electronic fund transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a person
other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate such transfer and from which the
consumer receives no benefit." EFTA § 903(11), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(l 1)(1994). The definition
expressly states that if the person initiating the transfer was given the access devise by the
consumer, unless the consumer gave the financial institution actual notice that transfers by such
person are no longer authorized, transfers are deemed authorized. Id.
100. Balto, supra note 9, at 1103.
101. Id. at 1102-03.
102. Id. at 1107-08. Reg. Z, under certain circumstances, grants the holder of a credit
card the right to assert claims or defenses against the card issuer. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1998).
Reg. E does not allow such a right against a financial institution.
103. An "unauthorized electronic fund transfer" means:
an electronic fund transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a
person other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate such
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unauthorized EFT unless the access device was an accepted card (or other
means of access) and the card issuer has provided the consumer with a means
whereby the consumer or user can be identified as the person authorized to use
the access device." °4 Examples of ways the card issuer can provide the card

user with identification as an authorized user include

"by signature,

photograph, or fingerprint or by electronic or mechanical confirmation."''

5

Even when the above conditions are satisfied, a consumer's liability is

limited to the lesser of $50 or the amount of the unauthorized transfer(s) if the
consumer reports the loss or theft of their card within two business days of
learning of the loss or theft." If a consumer reports the loss after two

business days from the time of discovery, the consumer is liable for the lesser
of $500 or the sum of $50 (or the amount of the unauthorized transfer(s)

occurring prior to the end of the second business day if less than $50) and the

amount of unauthorized transfer(s) that could have been prevented had the
consumer given timely notice."°7 A consumer is completely liable for all
unauthorized transfers that occur more than sixty days after the transmittal of

transfer and from which the consumer receives no benefit, but the term
does not include any electronic fund transfer (A) initiated by a person
other than the consumer who was furnished with the card, code, or other
means of access to such consumer's account by such consumer, unless the
consumer has notified the financial institution involved that transfers by
such other person are no longer authorized, (B) initiated with fraudulent
intent by the consumer or any other person acting in concert with the
consumer, or (C) which constitutes an error committed by a financial
institution.
EFTA § 903(11), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(l 1) (1994).
104. EFTA § 909(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (1994). An "accepted card or other means
of access" means:
a card, code, or other means of access to a consumer's account for the
purpose of initiating electronic fund transfers when the person to whom
such card or other means of access was issued has requested or received
or has signed or has used, or authorized another to use, such card or other
means of access for the purpose of transferring money between accounts
or obtaining money, property, labor or services ....
EFIA § 903(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(l) (1994).
105. Id.
106. EFTA § 909(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (1994). Although not conclusive, receiving
a periodic statement that reflects an unauthorized EFT may be evidence of the consumer's
knowledge that the card was lost or stolen. Official Staff Commentary on Reg. E, 12 C.F.R. pt.
205, Supp. I, § 205.6. A6-6.
107. EFIA § 909(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (1994).
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a periodic statement that reflects an unauthorized transfer.0 8 Thus, a duty is
imposed upon consumers to review their periodic statements.
There is an exception, however, to the above time limits in which a
consumer must provide notice to avoid the respective liability.' °9 If the
consumer fails to notify the financial institution within one of the time limits
as a result of extenuating circumstances," 0 Reg. E provides the consumer with
a reasonable extension in which notice may be provided."'
B. ERROR RESOLUTION

Reg. E also sets forth procedures a financial institution must follow in

the event of error resolution."' Under Reg. E, an "error" may constitute any
of the following: an unauthorized EFT,

an incorrect EFT to or from an

108. EFTA § 909(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)(2) (1994). In Kruser v. Bank of America
NT & SA, a husband and wife were found liable for all unauthorized electronic transfers
concerning their joint checking account. 230 Cal. App. 3d 741 (1991). The Krusers, believing
that Mr. Kruser's ATM card was destroyed, received a statement reflecting a $20 unauthorized
withdrawal in December of 1986. Id. at 744. The Krusers failed to notify the bank because,
during this time period, Mrs. Kruser underwent surgery, remained in the hospital for 11 days,
and spent the next six months recuperating at home. Id. In September of 1987, the Krusers
received statements for July and August, which reflected 47 unauthorized transfers totaling
$9020. Id. The bank was notified within a few days, however, the bank would not credit the
Kruser's account. Id. The court held that under § 1693g of the EFTA the Kruser's failure to
notify the bank within 60 days of receiving the statement that reflected the $20 unauthorized
transfer, the bank was relieved of liability for the unauthorized transfers that took place seven
months later. Id. at 750. The rationale relied on by the court is that the subsequent transfers
would not have occurred but for the Kruser's failure to timely report the $20 unauthorized
transfer. Id.
109. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(4) (1998).
110. Extenuating circumstances may include "extended travel or hospitalization." Id.
The Kruser court held an illness is not an extenuating circumstance under § 205.6(b)(4) of Reg.
E when the illness does not prevent a consumer from reviewing a bank statement. Kruser, 230
Cal. App.3d at 748. In Kruser, evidence established that Mrs. Kruser reviewed bank statements
while she was at home recuperating from her illness. Id.
111.
12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(4) (1998).
112. Id. § 205.11.
113. Under the definition of an "unauthorized electronic fund transfer", as defined in
the EFTA, supra note 103, an "errorcommitted by a financial institution" is expressly excluded
from the definition. Id. § 903(1 1)(C) (emphasis added). However, under § 908(0(1) of the
EFTA, an "error" means an unauthorized EFT. This apparent statutory discrepancy is clarified
in Reg. E where the definition of an "[u]nauthorized electronic fund transfer" does not qualify
the exclusion by using the term "error", but rather, it excludes any EFT that is "initiated by the
financial institution or its employee." 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m)(3) (1998). When "error"
requirements are satisfied, a financial institution must follow the procedures set forth under Reg.
E, § 205.11, if notified of an unauthorized EFT. Generally, these procedures may apply when
the financial institution receives oral or written notice of an alleged unauthorized EFT within
60 days after the institution has transmitted a periodic statement on which the error is first
reflected. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 l(b)(l)(i) (1998). Therefore, since notification within 60 days is
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a periodic statement that fails to reflect an EFT that should be

a computational or bookkeeping error made by the financial

institution,"" an incorrect amount of money received by a consumer from an

electronic terminal," 7 or a request by a consumer for clarification or
documentation relating to an EFT." 8
Any of the above circumstances constitutes an error if a financial
institution receives notice of such within sixty days of when the institution
sent the periodic statement that first reflects the alleged error. 9 Even when

the consumer reports a suspected error in a timely manner, a financial

institution is not obligated to immediately credit the consumer's account for
an amount equal to the alleged error." Prior to issuing a credit, the financial
institution is allowed an opportunity to conducta good faith investigation.''
If the investigation is not complete within ten business days a provisional

credit must be issued.

Once a provisional credit is issued, the financial

required for error resolution procedures to take effect, id., and since a consumer who fails to
report an unauthorized EFT within 60 of the transmittal of a statement reflecting an EFT is
liable for unauthorized transfers occurring after 60 days of transmittal, § 205.6(b)(3), when a
consumer fails to timely report an unauthorized EFT under § 205.11(b)(1)(i), a financial
institution need not follow the error resolution procedures with respect to unauthorized EFIs
that were not timely reported and the consumer is completely liable for those unauthorized EFTs
that occur after 60 days, even though these EFTs may have been timely reported in respect to
activating "error" resolution requirements. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (b)(1)(i) (1998).
114. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(a)(1)(ii) (1998).
115. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(a)(1)(iii) (1998).
116. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(a)(l)(iv) (1998).
117. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(a)(1)(v) (1998).
118. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (a)(l)(vii) (1998). An error also includes an EFT not properly
identified in accordance with § 205.9 or § 205.10(a). Id. § 205.1 1(a)(l)(vi).
119. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(b)(1)(i) (1998). Notice may be received by a financial
institution, from the consumer, in writing or through oral communication. Id. § 205.1 l(b)(1).
If notice is provided orally the financial institution may require the consumer to provide written
notice within 10 days of receiving oral notice. Id. § 205.11 (b)(2).
120. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 l(c)(1) (1998). At the time a consumer reports a possible error,
a financial institution is only obligated to credit a consumer's account immediately, or not later
than one business day, if enough facts were available at the time of the notification to determine
that an error had in fact occurred. See id. (stating that the institution shall correct the error
within one business day upon determining that an error occurred).
121. Id. If a consumer brings action against a financial institution for failing to comply
with liability provisions concerning an error and the court finds the financial institution did not
conduct a good faith investigation into the matter, the consumer is entitled to treble damages
under § 908(e)(1) of the EFTA.
122. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(2)(i) (1998). Allowing ten business days to ciredit a
consumer's account could turn into a serious problem for a consumer who loses a large amount
of money as the result of an error. Consider the following hypothetical. On December 23, 1998
a consumer loses their offline debit card while Christmas shopping. On Thursday, December
24, the consumer realizes the loss, learns that all $5,000 in their checking account has been
depleted and then notifies their financial institution. Assuming the financial institution is open
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institution may generally take up to forty-five calendar days, if needed, to
conclude its investigation.'
A financial institution that determines that an
error did occur must correct the error within one business day of its finding 2 4
and report notice to the consumer of its finding within three business days.'2 5
If the financial institution determines that no error occurred, this also
must be disclosed to the consumer within three business days of the determination.126 This disclosure must contain a written explanation of the financial
institution's findings and a statement explaining the consumer's right to

request the documentation that the financial institution relied on to reach its
conclusion.

7

Furthermore, a financial institution can debit the consumer's

account for an amount equal to the provisional credit."

Upon debiting this

amount, a financial institution must notify the consumer of the date and
amount of the debit and of the fact that the financial institution "will honor
checks, drafts, or similar paper instruments payable to third parties and
preauthorized transfers from the consumer's account (without charge to the

consumer as a result of an overdraft) for five business days after the notifica-

tion. ",129
If a consumer reasserts the same error after a financial institution has
complied with the error requirements under Reg. E, the financial institution
has no further responsibilities unless the reasserted error is based upon an

original request for documentation. 30 Therefore, a consumer's recourse for

suspected noncompliance would be limited to judicial action by filing a claim

on Christmas Eve, but only for limited purposes, the first full business day is Monday,
December 28, because a "business day" is defined in Reg. E as a day on which "the offices of
the consumer's financial institution are open to the public for carrying on substantially all
business function." 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(d) (1998). Further, considering that the financial
institution may be open for limited purposes on New Year's Eve and considering that it will be
closed completely for the New Year holiday and on weekends, the tenth business day arrives
on January 11, 1999. If the financial institution did not issue a temporary credit or resolve the
issue until the tenth business day, the consumer has no access to an amount equal to the amount
of the alleged error for 18 full calendar days. In this case, the consumer would be fortunate to
have a credit card.
123. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(2) (1998); see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(3) (1998) (stating
that when a provisional credit is granted by the tenth business day a financial institution is
allowed 90 calendar days to investigate so long as the unauthorized transfer(s) resulted from a
point-of-sale debit card transaction).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(1) (1998).
125. Id.
126. Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(d) (1998) (setting forth procedures a financial
institution must follow if it determines no error occurred).
127. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(d)(1) (1998).
128. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(d)(2) (1998).
129. Id.
130. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(e) (1998).
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that the3financial institution has failed to comply with, and thus violated, the
EFTA.1 1

V. LIABILITY ALLOCATION AND INDUSTRY REGULATORY MEASURES
A. CARD ISSUER PROTECTION

Under certain circumstances, Visa and MasterCard regulations provide

credit card issuers with extensive protection against liability when a card
issuer is obligated to waive a cardholder's liability that resulted from an
unauthorized use or billing error." Most of the protection works in the form
of chargebacks. 3 A "chargeback" is a procedure where a card issuer charges

an interchange transaction back to the merchant's bank 34 in accordance with
bankcard regulations. When certain criteria are met, a chargeback is the

means by which a card issuer electronically debits an amount from a merchant's account and credits an equal amount into their own account."3 5
131. EFTA § 915(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a) (1994).
132. Visa and MasterCard information relating to certain governing regulations, not
disclosed to the public, is confidential and cannot be publically divulged.
133. See generally Secrets about chargebacks when you deal with CardPro! (visited
Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.card-pro.com/chbks.htm> (on file with author). In general, a card
issuer, whose product(s) is processed through a bankcard's network may utilize such network
to electronically charge-back an amount to a merchant's account if the merchant failed to
comply with its contractual obligations under bankcard by-laws. To merchants who honor Visa
or MasterCard brand credit cards, chargebacks initiated by card issuers are not highly
anticipated transactions. Id. According to CardPro:
A merchant who gets even a few charge-backs has not been trained well
by their credit card provider or processor. They should get zero
chargebacks. The unpleasant critters known to most merchants who
accept credit cards are probably the worst part of doing business and
processing credit transactions either in-store or out of a home office.
Why? Chargebacks are what happens when a consumer decides that the
product or service provided by a merchant was not acceptable or didn't
meet his/her expectations.. . The credit card companie's [sic] policy is
that the customer is always right ...We teach our merchants to give
refunds whenever a customer asks for one, otherwise, they will
unwillingly give the refund and be charged fees for chargebacks as well.
Id.
134. This bank is referred to as an "acquirer". BUSINESS RESOURCES: FOR MERCHANTS
(visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http:lwww.mastercard.comlbusinesslmerchant/bankglos.html>. An
acquirer is a "licensed [bankcard] member that maintains the merchant relationship and acquires
the data relating to a transaction from the merchant or card acceptor and submits this data into
interchange, either directly or indirectly." Id.
135. A bankcard merchant means a "retailer, or any other person, firm, or corporation
that (pursuant to a merchant agreement) agrees to accept credit cards, debit cards, or both, when
properly presented." Id.
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For example, a cardholder may dispute a charge as unauthorized.

Assume that the charge reflects a transaction with a merchant who accepted

the cardholder's credit card number over the Interet or telephone. 36 As long

as the card issuer has evidence to support the cardholder's claim that the
charge was unauthorized (usually a signed affidavit is sufficient) and the merchant has failed to present the card issuer with concrete evidence that proves
the cardholder actually made the charge (such as a signature), the card issuer

has a contractual right to recover its loss through a chargeback. 37 The rationale behind this loss allocation is that a merchant who accepts credit cards over

the Internet or telephone assumes the risk of loss because the cardholder may
not be who he or she purports to be. Therefore, unless the merchant can
provide the card issuer with evidence that demonstrates the person using the
card was in fact the cardholder, a card issuer is permitted to initiate a
chargeback.138 Generally, chargebacks serve as an equitable means to allocate
liability among industry participants; liability that often results from a card
issuer's inability under the TILA and Reg. Z to hold the consumer liable for
39
legitimate unauthorized uses, billing errors and/or claims and defenses.
B. CARDHOLDER PROTECTION

Visa and MasterCard have also initiated self-regulatory measures to
allocate liability resulting from the unauthorized use of an offline debit card."
The respective measures, however, have not been initiated entirely in response
136. If the unauthorized use was not over the Internet or telephone and the merchant
followed appropriate procedure in processing the credit transaction, then the card issuer absorbs
the amount resulting from the unauthorized use because no chargeback right against the
merchant is available.
137. Randy Gainer, Allocating the Risk of Loss for Bank Card Fraud on the Internet, 15
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 39 (1996).
138. Other chargebacks may be initiated by card issuers against merchants when the sales
draft reflects an error in addition or an incorrect transaction amount, when merchandise received
is defective, when material transaction information on the sales draft appears illegible, when a
counterfeit transaction occurs, when a merchant fails to verify an account number, when
authorization was declined or an expired card was accepted, and when the merchant failed to
obtain a signature. If a merchant accepts a credit card, not over the Internet or telephone, and
obtains any form of writing that could constitute a signature on the sales draft, not even legible
writing or the cardholder's writing, there is no chargeback for failing to obtain a signature that
matches the signature on the back of a credit card. Thus, with respect to chargeback rights only,
verifying the signature written on the sales draft with the signature on the back of a credit card
is unnecessary in a practical sense since merchants need only obtain some form of scribble on
the sales draft.
139. Chargebacks may be an option when a cardholder initiates a dispute with a card
issuer and when the card issuer can demonstrate that the respective merchant failed to comply
with bankcard regulations.
140. Balto, supra note 9, at 1104.
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to federal legislation.' 4 ' Instead, these measures recognize the reality that an
offline debit card may be accepted and used without a PIN, just as a credit
card is used. These measures appear to reflect the failure of the EFTA to
provide the consumer with protection, similar to the liability limit provided
under the TILA, against the unauthorized use of an offline debit card. 42
When a MasterCard brand debit card is used to initiate an unauthorized
EFT a consumer is liable for $0 if the card is reported lost, stolen or used in
an unauthorized manner within twenty-four hours of discovery. 4 3 After this
time period a consumer is generally liable for a maximum of $50.'"
According to MasterCard, this policy change was completely consumeroriented. 45 Demonstrating this purpose, Alan Heuer, president of U.S.
Region, MasterCard International, stated that "[t]he Board realized that
consumers had come to expect a certain level of protection from MasterCard
brand."'4 6 Furthermore, support from industry members also reflects an
interest in protecting consumers who use offline debit cards. 47 Robert
Hedges, senior vice president at Fleet Financial Group, has commented:
"Given the critical role of credit and debit cards in the payment system, the
pro-active adoption of policies that ensure the programs' future success - by
protecting the consumers' interest - is an important move."' 4 8
Visa requires member institutions who issue Visa brand debit cards to
impose zero liability for unauthorized EFTs as long as the card is reported lost
or stolen within two business days of discovery. 49 If the consumer fails to
provide notice within two days of the loss or theft, Visa regulations set the
consumer's maximum liability at $50. m However, under Visa's policy, an

141. MasterCard advertises to have capped liability for unauthorized use of its debit card
products to protect consumers. See CARDTRAK ONLINE, MasterMoney Liability Reduced, July
*31, 1997 (on file with author).
142. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1) (1998) (limiting cardholder liability for the
unauthorized use of a credit card to $50).
143. Understanding Credit and Debit, CARDHOLDER SERVICES: MASTERCARD
UNIVERSITY (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.mastercard.com/consumer/mcu/credit.b5pg6.
html>.
144. Id.
145. See CARDTRAK ON.INE, MasterMoney Liability Reduced, July 31, 1997 (on file
with author).
146. Id.
147. The senior vice president of Chase Manhattan Bank claims that preventing fraud
and protecting debit card customer's funds is a key objective. Id.
148. Id.
149. Balto, supra note 9, at 1104-05; see also Statement of PIRG Responding to VISA
Announcement Limiting ATM Debit Card Liability, PUBUC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUPS
(visited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.pirg.org/consumer/banks/debit/pr-visa.htm>.
150. Id.
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institution that determines a cardholder was grossly negligent while handling
their debit card, and that this negligence resulted in unauthorized use, may
1 51
hold the cardholder liable to the extent allowed under the EFA.
VI. LEGISLATIVE ATrEMPTS TO AMEND THE

EFTA

As a legislative attempt to further limit a consumer's liability for
unauthorized EFTs initiated with a debit card, on September 9, 1997, Senator
Jack Reed 152 introduced Senate Bill 1154, the Dual-Use Debit Cardholder
Protection Act of 1997.13 Senate Bill 1154 would have limited a consumer's
liability to $50 for unauthorized EFTs that were initiated with an offline debit
card."M The maximum liability of $50 would have applied only to unauthorized transactions that occurred prior to the consumer notifying the financial
institution of card loss or theft and would be contingent upon the consumer
receiving mandatory, and timely, disclosures. 55 This bill, however, died with
the 105th Congress.
Also during the 105th Congressional term, on September 23, 1998, the
Senate passed an amended version of the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1998.56 Under this Act, § 208 would have implemented the Dual-Use
Debit Cardholder Protection Act of 1997.' Section 208 drew a distinction
between offline and online debit cards and created a separate liability
provision for each.'
Debit cards requiring a unique identifier prior to
initiating an EFT would have remained subject to traditional liability
provisions under the EFTA. 59 As defined in this bill, the unique identifier
needed to initiate an EFT may be by photograph, retina scan, fingerprint, or
by electronic or other mechanical confirmation." 6 This category of debit
cards is commonly categorized as online, such as ATM cards that require a
6
PIN prior to initiating an EFT.' '
151. Id. Visa also requires member institutions to give provisional credits within five
days of notice that an unauthorized transfer has occurred. Id.
152. Senator Reed is a member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.
153. S. 1154, 105th Cong. (1997).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
157. See id. § 208.
158. See id. § 208(a)(1).

159.

See id. (failing to strike § 909(a)(2) liability framework under the EFTA as applied

160.

Id. § 208(a)(1)(B)(iii).

to cards necessitating a unique identifier).

17

161.

See House, Senate Banking Members Raise ConcernsAbout Debit Cards, 16 NO.

BANKING POL'Y REP. 8, (Sept. 1, 1997).
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Section 208 would have created a new liability provision with regard to
offline debit cards. 62 This provision applied primarily to debit cards that can
be used without a unique identifier. 63 A consumer's signature did not
constitute a unique identifier under § 208."6 When the debit card is capable
of initiating an EFT without a unique identifier, the maximum amount of
liability a consumer can be held to for an unauthorized EFT would have been
limited to $50.161 Even this amount was contingent upon (1) the financial
institution properly issuing the debit card,"6 (2) the unauthorized EFT
occurring prior to the financial institution receiving notice that an unauthorized EFT has or may occur as the result of theft or loss, and (3) the consumer
timely notice requirements under § 905(a)(1) and § 905 (b) of the
receiving
167
EFTA.

The 106th Congress responded quickly to the 105th's inability to pass
the above-mentioned legislation. On February 24, 1999, House Representaof 1999.168
tive George W. Gekas introduced the Bankruptcy Reform Act
Different from the September 23rd version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1998, the 1999 bill has eliminated the former bill's § 208 provisions 6-9
provisions which were designed to amend the EFTA's liability framework.
However, § 113 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 is titled "Dual Use
Debit Card", and it simply requires the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to "conduct a study of existing protections provided to
consumers to limit their liability for unauthorized use of a debit card or similar
access devices."' 7° More specifically, § 113 requires an examination of: (1)
Reg. E,17'
unauthorized use liability protection granted under the EFTA and
(2) voluntary industry rules that may enhance a consumer's protection against

162. See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 208(a)(2) (1998) (inserting new liability provision
applicable to debit cards that can be used without a unique identifier).
163. Id.
164. See H.R. 3150 § 208(1)(B)(iii) (striking signature from category of unique identifier
for purposes of new liability provision).
165. Id. § 208(a)(1)(B)(iv).
166. Id. Section 911 under the EFTA addresses the issuance of debit cards. The
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 would have amended this section by inserting that
a financial institution that provides a debit card that does not require a unique identifier other
than a signature must be accompanied by "a clear and conspicuous disclosure that use of the
card may not require the use of such code or other unique identifier." Id. § 208(b)(1)(B).

167. Id. § 208(a)(1)(B)(iv).
168. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 had 106 cosponsors by the end of August, 1999.
169. See generally id. (failing to incorporate a formally proposed amendment to the
EFTA's liability framework concerning unauthorized use).

170.
171.

§ 113(a).
Id.
§ I13(b)(l).
Id.
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unauthorized use, 172 and (3) whether amending federal legislation is
"necessary to provide adequate protection for consumers in this area."' 173 This
legislation is practical to the extent that it essentially requires a semi-formal
inquiry into whether amending the EFTA's present liability framework is
necessary and in the best interest of society.
Aside from the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, other legislation -has
recently been introduced into the House of Representatives. This legislation
is intended to specifically amend the EFTA's liability framework governing
unauthorized EFTs. 7 4 On February 2, 1999, House Representative Thomas
M. Barrett introduced the Consumer Debit Card Protection Act.'7 5 This bill,
similar to § 208 under the September version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1998, will amend the EFTA's liability framework so that a consumer
cannot be held liable in excess of $50 for an unauthorized EFT initiated with
a card that failed to necessitate a unique identifier. 76 Additionally, the bill
will prohibit the imposition of fees charged to a consumer's account for
insufficient funds resulting from an unauthorized offline debit card transaction.' 77
If enacted, amendments pursuant to § 5 of the Consumer Debit Card
Protection Act will create a liability framework for offline debit cards similar
to the liability framework applicable to credit cards under the TILA 71
Moreover, the Consumer Debit Card Protection Act fails to impose any time
limit upon which a consumer must claim an unauthorized EFT in order to
enjoy the $50 liability limit. Apparently, the characteristic that justifies
discriminating between plastic debit devices is that use may or may not be
dependent upon a unique identifier or, in other words, some debit cards
7
require only a signature for identification.1 1

172. Id. § 113(b)(2).
173. Id. § 113(b)(3). If the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 is enacted with provisions
identical to the current provisions under § 113, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System will have 2 years from the date of enactment to publically report its findings. Id. §
113(c).
174. H.R. 445, 106th Cong. (1999). As of the end of August, 1999, this bill had only
two co-sponsors.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 5(a)(1)(C).
177. Id. § 8.
178. Compare TILA § 133(a)(1) (limiting cardholder liability to $50, contingent upon
unauthorized use occurring prior to the card issuer receiving notice of a lost or stolen card and
the card issuer complying with its affirmative notice requirements), with H.R. 445, § 5(a)(1)(C)

(limiting consumer liability to $50 for unauthorized EFT initiated with card not necessitating
a unique identifier, contingent upon the proper issuance of such card and the unauthorized EFT
occurring prior to the card issuer receiving notice of a lost or stolen card).
179. Section 2 under H.R. 445 is entitled "Congressional Findings". Such findings
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VII. DISCUSSION
A. FAILING TO LIMIT TIME TO REPORT UNAUTHORIZED CREDIT CARD USE

Is it reasonable for a credit card issuer to absorb all liability in excess of
$50 when a cardholder reports an unauthorized use after sixty days from when

the unauthorized use was first reflected on the cardholder's periodic
0
statement? The answer Congress provided was yes," yet the rationale behind

that answer may lack merit. Evidenced by Senate testimony, Congress has

justified placing the risk of loss on the card issuer because the card issuer is
8
generally in a better financial position to absorb the loss.' ' As a result, any
loss a card issuer incurs is treated as a cost of doing business, and ultimately,
this cost is passed to consumers who use the card issuer's products and

services.'

The problem with the above rationale is twofold. First, a cardholder, not
a card issuer, is in the best position to prevent future unauthorized uses by

notifying the card issuer of an unauthorized use that has been reflected on a
periodic statement."8 3 Moreover, a merchant who accepts credit cards is also

include: "According to industry analysts, as many as 1,300,000 new debit cards which can be
used like credit cards are issued each month." Id. § 2(2). "Ifcurrent trends continue, debit cards
that can be used like credit cards will soon rival the popularity of credit cards and some banking
experts predict that more than 2/3 of the households in the United States will have such a card
by the year 2000." Id. § 2(3).
180. See TILA § 133(a) (limiting cardholder liability to $50 for unauthorized use is not
contingent upon providing the card issuer with timely notice).
181. Matthews, supra note 33, at 251. Imposing the loss that results from unauthorized
use on the card issuer because the card issuer is in a better position to bear the loss is consistent
with the loss spreading principle. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Consequences of Bulk in Our
Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of Checks and the Bank's Duty of Ordinary Care Under the 1990
Revision to the Uniform Commercial Code When it HonorsForged Checks, 63 TEMP. L. REV.
729,745 (1990).
182. See Matthews, supra note 33 at 251-52 (asserting that unauthorized use costs
absorbed by a card issuer can be treated as part of operating costs). The loss spreading principle
is one consideration in developing efficient payment law. Cooter, supra note 1, at 71. This
principle assigns "liability for a loss to the party that can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest
cost. In general, the party that can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest cost is the one that has
greater economic resources and is in a position to spread the loss most effectively." Id.
183. Under the loss reduction principle, liability should fall upon the person who can
reduce losses at the lowest cost. Budnitz, supra note 181, at 746. One of the elements of this
principle is precaution. Id. A cardholder, given thirty days to review a periodic statement and
to report a reflection of an unauthorized use is in the best position to take precautions against
future unauthorized use because the cardholder knows whether they made a reflected purchase
better than the card issuer. See generallyid. (remarking that a customer of a bank, many times,
can take precautions at the lowest cost, concerning future forged checks, by simply reviewing
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in a better position to prevent unauthorized use than the card issuer. Simply
requiring a merchant to verify signatures and proper photo identification when
feasible," 4 similar to when a check is offered as payment, will provide a
strong disincentive to those who intend to perpetrate an unauthorized use and
will serve as front line prevention against an unauthorized use. Second,
limiting a cardholder's liability to $50 for a claim of unauthorized use made
more than sixty days after the charge first appeared on the statement

encourages irresponsible account maintenance"' and generally places an
undue burden on card issuers regarding the ability to properly investigate the
claim. 6
To help promote responsible account maintenance, Congress could
impose a time frame outside of which a cardholder will be estopped from
asserting an unauthorized use and thus lose the protection of the $50 liability
past paid checks because a customer knows her signature better than her bank). The loss
reduction principle is more complex than the loss spreading principle because it "assigns
liability for the more complex purpose of affecting human behavior." Cooter, supra note 1, at
73. The loss reduction principle contains four elements of operation: precaution, innovation,
responsiveness, and learning. Id.
184. Because photo identification and signatures are not mandated by bank card bylaws
or the federal government, credit cards can be accepted absent any element of human contact.
One example is at gas stations. Credit cards can be used to purchase gasoline by merely
inserting a valid credit card into the appropriate slot built into the pump. In fact, with
technology rapidly advancing, the physical act of inserting a credit card into the gas pump may
soon be obviated.
185. Drafting laws that encourage precaution in handling payment instruments raise
complex issues:
If liability falls upon only one party, how can the liability rules motivate
other parties to take precaution as well? This phenomenon is an example
of the 'paradox of compensation,' which afflicts no-fault rules in the areas
of law. Holding one party strictly liable for a loss erodes the other party's
incentive to take precaution and to refrain from any action that would
increase the loss. Economic analysis suggests that fault-based liability
rules are a solution to this paradox. Any fault rule, including simple
negligence, negligence with a contributory negligence defense, and comparative negligence, will motivate one party to satisfy the legal standard
of fault in order to avoid liability, while inducing the other party to take
precaution because it must bear any residual responsibility for the loss.
Cooter, supra note 1, at 74.
186. When a cardholder claims an unauthorized use, a card issuer may investigate, in
part, by obtaining the respective sales slip, or receipt of purchase, and then by comparing the
signature on the sales slip to the cardholder's signature on their credit card application. See
Official Staff Commentary to Reg. Z, supra note 46, § 226.12(b)-3(iv) (comparing the signature
on credit slip for the purchase to a signature of cardholder on record is one factor that makes an
investigation reasonable). However, a merchant's bank is only required under industry by-laws
to store sales slips for a limited time and thus, if the cardholder's claim is made after this time,
then the card issuer will be unable to obtain a copy of the sales slip which usually evidences the
unauthorized use.
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cap. One solution may be to limit the time frame to six months following the
date the periodic statement reflecting the unauthorized use was mailed. This
would ameliorate the burden placed on the card issuer when an unauthorized
use is claimed at a much later date, and at a time which may prove unfeasible
for the card issuer to attain the sales slips necessary to conduct a reasonable
investigation. However, the TILA must balance such equities with an
amended framework that provides for adequate consumer protection and
encourages responsible account maintenance. This balance could be attained
by setting a maximum liability cap of $500,187 applicable to unauthorized use
claims reported after six months following the date the periodic statement
reflecting the unauthorized use was mailed.' 88 A $500 liability limit would
encourage cardholders to review their periodic statements, thereby encouraging responsible account maintenance and making fraud more readily
detectable. At the same time, a $500 cap would adequately protect consumers
from absolute liability, regardless of the time an unauthorized use was
reported, and it would recognize practical obstacles involved in conducting a
reasonable investigation more than six months after the periodic statement
reflecting an unauthorized use was mailed.
Failing to impose a time frame to report an unauthorized EFT is also not
reasonable as applied to a transaction initiated with an offline debit card. To
help support this proposition, the nature and functional differences of a credit
card transaction must be examined generally and compared to other traditional
methods of payment.
1. Nature of Payment with CreditCard
When a consumer obtains a credit card, a contract between the consumer
and the card issuer is entered.' 9 This contract is governed generally under
state law and is subject to applicable federal laws such as the TILA and Reg.
187. Using liability as an incentive toward precaution on behalf of the consumer will
have little effect unless the consumer's behavior responds to the imposition. Cooter, supra note
1, at 75. The element of learning now becomes essential for the loss reduction principle to
operate. See id. "Over time, people tend to learn about liability laws, and their level of
responsiveness will usually increase as they realize the need to conform their behavior to the
laws' demands and understand the means for doing so." Id.
188. Under the loss reduction principle, the element of innovation "modifies the effect
of the precaution element." Id. at 76. With regard to credit card companies, the implementation
of fraud-prevention technology is largely driven by the law's assignment of liability. See id. at
76, 77 (stating that the development of technological mechanisms to prevent fraud have been
financed by interested financial institutions). Therefore, "[p]ayment rules that assign liability
to financial institutions... act as an incentive for the continued development of antifraud
innovations." Id. at 77.

189. Matthews, supra note 33, at 237-38.
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Z.' 90 The product, or credit card, may vary according to the terms of the
contract. The brand of card also may vary. For instance, the card brand could
be Visa, MasterCard, Discover, American Express, or any other card
provider."9 ' Essential services a card provider extends include providing a
regulated bankcard network for processing transactions and clearing"9 funds
between the merchant's bank and the card issuer's bank.'93 Furthermore, all
persons who issue or accept particular brands of credit cards are subject to
contractual regulations issued by the respective card provider. 94 In accordance with applicable federal laws, these regulations govern the rights of a
card issuer, merchant, and card provider with respect to matters involving a
credit card.' 95 It is also important to understand that card providers are not in
the business of extending credit. It is revenue from member institutions in the
form of annual fees, interchange fees,'" and other service-oriented fees that
allows card providers to operate. 197
When a credit card is used at a merchant location, few safeguards protect
against unauthorized use. 98 Merchants are in business to profit and thus, there
is a natural incentive to accept any legal form of payment, taking into
consideration the risk of nonpayment. A merchant who accepts a valid credit
card in person and who obtains a signed sales slip assumes very little risk of
nonpayment, even when the person using the credit card is not authorized to

190.

See generally id. at 238.

191. See id. at 233 (noting Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover, and Diners
Club as some of the larger credit card providers). In contrast, examples of card issuers are
Citibank or MBNA America.
192. In this context, the term "clearing" refers to "the process of exchanging financial
transaction details between an acquirer and an issuer to facilitate posting of a cardholder's
account and reconciliation of a customer's settlement position." BusDN ss RESOURCES: FOR
MERCHANTS (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.mastercard.combusiness/merchant/bankglos.
html>..
193 . See Matthews, supra note 33, at 240 (stating that the terms of these services are
contained within the association agreement).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. An interchange fee is charged every time a transaction is processed through a Visa
or MasterCard network. See id.
197. Member institutions pay various service fees to the provider of a bankcard system.
See generally id.

198.

Current technology that has been implemented by Visa to help combat credit card

fraud includes card activation programs, address verification services for telephone transactions,
and Visa's Cardholder Risk Identification Service (CRIS). Visa's CRIS employs artificial
intelligence to identify purchasing patterns that their system flags as suspect or possible fraud.

HOTEL ONLINE PRESS RELEASE, Visa Reports Card Fraud Drops to Record Low; Anti-Fraud

Programs Produce Dramatic Results (visited Apr. 5, 1999)
<http://www.hotelonline.com/Neo/News/PressReleasesl998/VisaReducesFraudFebl998.html>.
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use it. 99 Put simply, merchants are generally not.in the business of detecting
fraud and thus no chargeback right exists solely because the use was
unauthorized. A chargeback regulation based solely on the occurrence of an
unauthorized use would essentially re-allocate liability from the card issuer to
the merchant. Therefore, a card issuer usually absorbs the cost of an
2 °
unauthorized use under industry chargeback regulations and the TILA.
In most cases, it is equitable to place the cost of an unauthorized use on
the card issuer since the card issuer is the proprietor of a product that can
easily be used to legally bind a consumer to large amounts of debt, only
limited by successful fraud-prevention controls and the consumer's credit line.
It seems inequitable, however, to hold a card issuer fully liable for amounts
incurred after a cardholder has had a reasonable amount of time to learn that
the credit card has been used to make unauthorized purchases. No other
commonly accepted method of payment in America offers a consumer such
liberal protection against unauthorized use as does payment with a credit card
under the TILA. For example, it would be difficult to structure a convincing
argument that the federal government should enact consumer protection
legislation that limits a consumer's liability for the unauthorized use of cash.
Legislation as such would promote negligence, provide little societal benefit,
and place an unimaginable burden upon the Federal Reserve System."°
2. Nature of Payment with Check
A consumer who uses a check as a method of payment is not entitled -to
the same extent of liability protection offered to a credit card holder.2 2
Generally speaking, a "bank may refuse to reimburse you for a forged check
if it believes you were negligent, ... [which may include] failing to safeguard
your checks, filling them out in a way that would be easy to alter, or not
notifying the bank about a loss in a timely manner." 20 a
199. Although merchants are required to review the signature on the credit card with the
signature on the sales slip, merchants are not susceptible to a chargeback merely because a
signature is forged on the sales draft.
200. TILA § 133(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1994).
201. In the United States, the Federal Reserve System functions as the central bank and
monetary authority. Wn.UAM A.McEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION
292 (3d ed. 1994). This authority entails the power to issue bank notes. Id.
202. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1998) (failing to exercise ordinary care that substantially
contributes to the making of a forged signature on an instrument bars one from asserting the
forgery against a person who pays the instrument in good faith). See also U.C.C. § 4-406(c)
(1998) (stating that a customer, whose bank makes available a statement of account, must
exercise reasonable promptness in examining the statement to determine whether any payment
was unauthorized because a purported signature by or on behalf of customer was unauthorized).
203.

Mark Mellon, FDIC attorney, cited in FDIC CONSUMER NEWS, Know Your
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As one plausible justification for this different treatment, a checkpayment is accepted, processed and handled in very different ways than when
a credit card is used as a method of payment.' When a check is accepted by
a merchant it is eventually deposited into the merchant's bank. 5 This bank,
the depositary institution, then sends the check through the appropriate
channels to collect on it. 6 The check is eventually presented for payment to
the bank upon which the check was drawn.' The paying bank settles for the

check if it fails to timely return the check.' As a general rule, a paying bank
that accepts a check that contains a forged drawer's signature is liable for the
amount of the check.' However, if the paying bank can prove the drawer of
the check was negligent, and this negligence substantially contributed to the

(Liability)Limits (on file with author).
204. Negotiable instruments and the check collection process are largely governed by
Article 3 and Article 4, respectively, of the U.C.C. See also Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. pt. 210
(1998) (governing the collection of checks and other cash and noncash items and the handling
of returned checks by Federal Reserve Banks); Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1998)
(governing the availability of funds and other aspects of the check collection process).
205. A depositary bank means "the first bank to receive an item even though it is also
the payor bank, unless the item is presented for immediate payment over the counter." U.C.C.
§ 4-105(2) (1998). Whereas a payor bank means "a bank that is the drawee of a draft." Id. §
4-105(3).
206. See generally id. § 4-202 (1998) (stating the basic responsibilities of a collecting
bank).
207. See generally id. § 4-204 (1998) (providing general standards regarding sending
or presenting a check to a payor bank for collection).
208. Under the U.C.C., a payor bank must return a check or send notice of dishonor
before it has made final payment on the item and before the expiration of its midnight deadline.
id. § 4-301(a) (1998). See Essex Constr. Corp. v. Industrial Bank of Wash., 913 F. Supp. 416,
419 (D. Md. 1995) (holding that a payor bank must decide to pay or return a check by midnight
of the day it receives it for collection, and failure to do so is final payment). The "midnight
deadline", with respect to a bank, is defined as "midnight on its next banking day following the
banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking
action commences to run, whichever is later." U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(10) (1998). See Go-Tane
Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Sharp, 397 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (concluding that midnight
deadline runs from receipt of an item at a bank's computer center). Also note, if a payor bank
returns or dishonors a check prior to its midnight deadline, then the depository bank becomes
subject to a midnight deadline to charge-back the payee or its customer for an amount equal to
that paid or posted on the dishonored check. See Lufthansa German Airlines v. Bank of Am.,
N.T.S.A., 478 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (determining that midnight deadline for
depositary bank to charge-back customer runs from the time depositary bank learns facts of
dishonor).
209. See U.C.C. § 3-417(a) (1998) (providing no warranty to the drawee making
payment that the signature on the check is authorized without the drawee having knowledge that
the signature of the drawer of the check is unauthorized). It is a well-settled rule of law that "the
drawee of a draft takes the risk that the drawer's signature is unauthorized unless the person
presenting the draft has knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized." Id. § 3-417,
cmt. 3 (citing Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762)).
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making of the forged signature, then the drawer or customer is liable for the

loss.2" Although the drawer of a check is not liable for a forged check that is
paid when her conduct did not substantially contribute to the making of a

forged signature, a drawer of a check will bear the loss of subsequent forged

checks when the drawer fails to report a forgery upon receiving the check that

first contained a forged signature and the accompanying statement.2"

Checks, unlike credit cards, usually are accepted by merchants after the
consumer presents proper identification. This is because the risk that the
merchant may not receive payment is greater when a check is used as a
method of payment. For instance, a practical risk merchants face is the risk

that the drawer's account has funds insufficient to pay the par value of the

check. If a merchant accepts a check that is timely returned for insufficient

funds, then the merchant absorbs the loss.2"

As a merchant takes into consideration the practical risk of accepting a
bad check, consumers also make practical considerations when paying with
a check. Unlike credit cards, there is no extension of credit involved.' 3 A
check generally represents nothing more than a promise to pay a certain
amount that is available upon demand.2" 4 Since checks are a method of

payment using available and entitled funds and credit cards function as a
method of deferring payment by using funds belonging to a creditor, using a
check as a method of payment is likely to naturally induce more responsibility
in respect to account maintenance by the consumer.
As an additional consideration, checks are typically recorded in the
consumer's register. Recording check-initiated transactions provides a
consumer with a simple way to track the checking account balance. On the
other hand, credit card transactions leave the consumer with a copy of the
sales slip, which provides the consumer with little assistance unless these slips

210. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1998).
211. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1998). Regardless of whether a customer or payor bank is
negligent, a customer who fails to report an unauthorized signature on a check within one year
after the customer received a statement reflecting the signature is barred from asserting against
the bank the unauthorized signature. Id. § 4-406(0.
212. Id. § 4-301 (1998) (expressing that payment on a check may generally be revoked
if the check is returned to the sender prior to midnight on the banking day after the banking day
on which the check is received). If the drawer's account, on which the check is payable,
contains insufficient funds to cover the face value of the check, the payor bank may return the
check when done prior to its midnight deadline. See generally id.
213. See U.C.C. § 3-104(0 (1998) (stating that a check is "a draft, other than a
documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank").
214. Id. One important characteristic of a negotiable instrument is that it is an
"unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money." Id. § 3-104(a). "The most
common type of demand deposit is the checking account." ERIC N. COMPTON, PRINCIPLES OF
BANKING 7 (2d ed. 1986). Funds held in demand deposits can be withdrawn at any time. Id.
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are recorded or kept. Therefore, a consumer who falls victim to check fraud
may be able to determine such activity faster because the consumer's checkinitiated transactions are recorded in the consumer's check register. In respect
to consumer liability for falling victim to check fraud, this difference may help
justify the consumer's obligation to maintain a U.C.C. standard of care when
using paper checks as a method of payment.
Consumers also may have additional notification from their financial
institutions when checks are used in an unauthorized manner. For instance,
when a check is not honored for insufficient funds it will be returned by the
drawee bank and a non-sufficient funds fee will generally be assessed to the
consumer's account. Notification that a check has bounced and that a fee has
been charged will be mailed promptly to the consumer. When a credit card is
used to initiate an unauthorized transaction, a consumer will not receive
notification that the credit line is reached unless fraud-prevention technology
flags the account as suspect or the consumer reports the unauthorized use.
Prompt notification that a check has bounced provides additional justification
for imposing a duty upon consumers to report an unauthorized check-initiated
transaction.
Whether a check bounces or a credit line is spent from unauthorized use,
the consumer's purchasing power has been depleted. It is likely, however, that
the average consumer's available credit line over exceeds his average
available checking account balance. The risk to the consumer therefore
increases if a credit card is used in an unauthorized fashion. Since the risk of
being bound to large amounts of debt is greater than the risk of losing a
checking account balance, state law may also justifiably provide less liability
protection to a consumer by imposing a duty to report the first forged check
the consumer has notification of, as contrasted to the failure to impose a
similar duty under the TILA's liability provisions concerning unauthorized
credit card use.
3. Nature of Payment with Debit Card
A debit card holds characteristics of both credit cards and checks.215 An
obvious similarity between debit and credit cards is that they both are access
devices to financial accounts in the form of a plastic card. The process, or
method of payment, however, may operate quite differently.216 As already
215. See generally Debit Cards:New Twists and Risks, BANK RATE MONrrOR, Sept. 5,
1997 (noting that offline debit cards draw funds directly from checking accounts like checks,
yet are used like credit cards because a sales slip is signed and fund withdrawal is not
immediate).
216. See id.
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mentioned, there are two types of debit cards, online and offline, and both
types process transactions in very different ways. An online debit card
requires a PIN prior to use and will initiate an EFT immediately. 21" On the
other hand, an offline debit card is processed, in some respects, similar to a
credit card, yet the method of payment is similar to a check.2t 8
Similar to a credit card, when an offline debit card is used a signature on
the sales slip is required.219 This sales slip is evidence that the merchant is
owed an amount of money equal to the amount of the purchase.22 Also like
the credit card process, this transaction moves electronically through a
network, depending on the brand of the card or network provider, such as one
provided by Visa or MasterCard. Similar to using a check as a method of
payment, the network provider then clears the funds, similar to the role of a
clearinghouse in the check collection process. 22' Final payment, or the time
when the consumer's demand account is debited, may occur two to three days
after the transaction was initiated, which is also similar to the time it may take
to collect final payment on a check.222
The key characteristic legally distinguishing an offline debit card
transaction from a paper check transaction is that the transfer-of-funds process
is initiated at an electronic POS terminal, and therefore, the EFTA governs the
transaction. 3 This characteristic alone, however, provides little support for
different treatment regarding liability allocation. Functional similarities
between the debit card transaction and check transaction provide better
support for maintaining different liability allocation frameworks for unauthorized debit and credit card use. Aside from whether it is a paper check being
used to initiate payment or an electronic impulse, it is the same financial
institution that holds the consumer's checking or debit account, the nature of
the account remains a demand deposit, the same notifications are provided if
the account is overdrawn and consumers are likely to record debit card
transactions in the same manner checks are recorded.

217. THE BETTER BusiNusS BUREAU, Tips On... Using Debit Cards (visited Dec. 28,
1998) <http://www.bbb.org/library/debitcard.htm>; see also Balto, supra note 9, at 1098.
218. Balto, supra note 9, at 1098.
219. Id.
220. See Matthews, supra note 33, at 243 (commenting that a sales slip is evidence of
a merchant's right to payment from the card issuer and of a credit card holder's obligation to
pay the card issuer).
221. See generally Balto, supra note 9, at 1094.
222. See id.at 1098; see also Debit Cards: New Twists and Risks, BANK RATE MoNrFOR,

Sept. 5, 1997.
223.

See generally EFTA at § 903(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1994).
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B. ADDITIONAL INDUSTRY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Industry Benefits and Safeguards
If an offline debit card functions more like a check, should Congress
amend the liability provisions of the EFTA with respect to unauthorized EFTs
merely because the access device looks like a credit card and is accepted
without a unique identifier? Based in part on the consumer protection policies
already initiated by Visa and MasterCard," the answer to this question is in
the negative. Visa and MasterCard claim to have reduced the possible liability
of a consumer who uses their brands of offline debit cards because they want
to protect the consumer, however, there may be more practical reasons that
explain why these policies were implemented. To begin, it is not Visa or
MasterCard that must absorb the cost of this liability, rather it is the card
issuing member institution that absorbs this cost. Another practical reason
Visa and MasterCard implemented policies that reduce a consumer's liability
more than the EFTA provides is because, in effect, this seemingly consumeroriented policy can be diligently advertised to the consumer 225 and serves as
an incentive to utilize Visa and MasterCard's network by obtaining and using
their offline debit brand cards.226 As long as the market remains lucrative,
consumer-oriented policies remain in full effect, and fraud-prevention
measures keep fraud minimal, legislative intervention is not necessary.
The industry or network providers have kept the market lucrative in two
ways: the promotion of offline debit cards and the imposition of an interchange fee per transaction. As a motivating pecuniary benefit resulting from
more consumers obtaining offline debit cards, Visa and MasterCard receive
224. See Understanding Credit and Debit, CARDHOLDER SERVICES: MASTERCARD
UNIVERSITY (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.mastercard.comconsumer/mcu/creditb5pg6.
htm> (stating that liability resulting from a MasterMoney debit card transaction is generally
capped between $0-$50 when use is unauthorized). Visa also has generally capped consumer
liability between $0-$50 for unauthorized use of a Visa Check (debit) Card. See also Balto,
supra note 9, at 1104-05 (describing the self-regulatory efforts of Visa and MasterCard). This
is similar to the TILA liability limit regarding credit cards. See TILA § 133(a)(1)(B) (limiting
maximum liability to $50 for an unauthorized use).
225. A consumer unfamiliar with the EFTA's liability framework may not realize that,
generally, as long as a lost or stolen debit card is reported within two days of when the consumer
learned of the loss or theft, the maximum dollar amount a consumer can be held liable for an
unauthorized use is $50. See EFTA § 909(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1994).
226. Visa has begun to promote consumer education awareness programs about debit
card use and its policies on liability. See Visa Expands Debit Card Consumer Education With
National Consumers League, PR NEWSWIRE, July 27, 1998. "Visa's survey showed that nearly
60 percent of cardholders who had not heard of Visa's $0-liability policy said they felt even
more secure about using their card once the policy was explained." Id.
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interchange revenue every time an offline debit card is processed through their
networks.227 This interchange amount is similar to the amount charged to

process a credit card transaction. 228 Moreover, since Visa and MasterCard

have developed their businesses around the credit card transaction, and in
compliance with the TILA and Reg. Z, and since a similar interchange amount
is charged for both credit card transactions and offline debit card transactions,

implementing debit card liability allocation policies similar to those applicable

to credit cards may help justify the application of a similar interchange fee for
Due to the increasing demand of the
processing debit card transactions.
offline debit card and the potential loss of credit card users, it is certainly
advantageous for Visa and MasterCard to gain debit card network users and
to receive the same interchange fee as when a credit card is processed.

A current problem with the Visa and MasterCard interchange price
structures, which could result in fewer merchants accepting debit cards, is that

processing expenses, similar to those involved with credit cards, do not exist

for offline debit card transactions.? Interchange fees for offline debit card
much as] 14 times more than the most expensive ontransactions can "cost [as
line debit transaction."23 ' Taking another perspective, the Acting Assistant

227. Ralph E. Spurgin, It's Got to Stop: Retailers Protest Debit Card Tying, CREDIT
May-June 1998, at 18; see also Balto, supra note 9, at 1096.
228. Spurgin, supra note 227, at 18; see also Balto, supra note 9, at 1098.

WORLD,

229.

See generally Debit Follows In Credit's Corporate Card Footsteps, DEBIT CARD

231.

Id. See also Raising the Debit Card Stakes, WWD, May 28, 1997, at 5. NYCE,

NEWS, April 30, 1997 (stating that "a growing number of off-line [debit] card issuers [are]
already generating large revenues by leveraging the payments foundation created for credit card
transactions ....).
230. Spurgin, supra note 227, at 18. With respect to a credit card transaction, certain
expenses justify the amount of the interchange fee. See id. These expenses include, "financing
the receivables, collections and bad debt, stationery, postage, and other expenses such as credit
bureau reports and those involving the new accounts and customer service operation." Id. With
respect to debit cards,
[Tihere is no financing expense. The transaction amount is taken from the
customer's checking account. There is little or no bad debt, and there
certainly is no reason the bad debt should be any greater than what banks
experience with normal checking accounts. There are no unique
stationery and postage expenses, because debit card transactions are
posted to the checking account statement, which is mailed to the
consumer in any case. There are no credit bureau reports needed. An
infrastructure, which needed to be established for credit card activity, was
not necessary for the debit activity because a checking account
infrastructure already existed. Simply put: The costs for debit cards are
much lower than the costs for credit cards; yet, the price being charged is
similar.
Id.

an online debit card network provider and competitor to offline debit card providers, charges
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Director of the Office of Policy and Evaluation of the Federal Trade Commis-

sion's Bureau of Competition has commented that the offline debit card fee

structure "creates perverse incentives to favor the more costly system. 232
This issue is further discussed below.
2. General Considerations

In amending the EFTA relating to consumer liability, Congress may be
responding to a problem that does not exist.233 Senator Bennett, Chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee's Subcommittee on Financial Services and
Technology, appeared to justify capping a consumer's liability at $50 for
unauthorized debit card use when he stated: "[i]t is a good first step in
attempting to reduce some of the outrageous costs of consumer [debit card]
fraud." 2" According to MasterCard, however, "fraud losses on MasterMoney
'
[debit] cards have remained extremely low."235
In fact, "[o]f the hundreds of
millions of MasterCard transactions that took place in 1996, only two one-

hundredths of one percent (.02%) were fraudulent. 236 Moreover, in 1996
financial institutions lost over eight times as much money from fraudulent

credit card use as compared to offline debit card fraud.23 MasterCard claims

that a "key reason that MasterMoney fraud numbers are so low is that our
member financial institutions do a tremendous job of protecting themselves

only 7.5 cents on a $100 purchase, and MAC, another online provider, charges only 6.5 cents.
Id.

232. Balto, supra note 9, at 1099.
233. "In an operating market, private agreements between parties will generally produce
economically efficient results without the need for legal intervention." Cooter, supra note 1, at
68.
Intervention becomes necessary, however, when the market fails to
produce these efficient results on its own. Rules that are designed to
achieve economic efficiency in payment law, therefore, should enforce
agreements between private parties when no market failure has occurred.
When market failures exist, legal rules can improve upon private
agreements if they are designed with the goal of minimizing costs in
mind.
Id. (footnote omitted).
234.

Sen. Bob Bennett, Bennett Promotes Bill to Protect Victims of Debit Card Fraud,

Sen. Bennett-Press Release, Sept. 23, 1997 (on file with author).
235. CARDTRAK ONLINE, MasterMoney Liability Reduced, July 31, 1997, citing Irene
Katen, Vice President of Business Management, U.S. Deposit Access, MasterCard International.
236. Id. During 1997, Visa and MasterCard officials claimed that "roughly .01 percent

of all debit card transactions were fraudulent .. " Debit FraudDetection In Credit-Bureau
Style, BANK TECH. NEWS, Mar. 1998.
237. The Fast-Growing Debit Market Gets New Tools To Show Fraud,DEBIT CARD
NEWS, July 31, 1997.
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and their cardholders.""23 Possibly an additional explanation is that consumers
are generally more responsible in maintaining debit card accounts than in
maintaining credit card accounts because debit cards "draw directly on
' 9 And thus, the risk of
customer deposits in checking or savings accounts."23
losing available money has a different affect on one's attitude toward
protecting against such risk, as compared to protecting against the risk of
being bound to debt.
When offline debit card use increases, not only does Visa and
MasterCard's revenue increase, but so does the revenue of the financial
institution that issues the debit card.' ° These revenues result from interchange fees that are received every time a transaction is processed through the
network of an offline debit card provider.2 4 For example, for a $100
purchase, made with a MasterMoney offline debit card, MasterCard charges
an interchange fee of $1.32.2 A small portion of this revenue is received by
24 3
At best, this revenue
the financial institution that issued the debit card.
an offline debit card
providing
equals the financial institution's expenses for
product.
As a consequence of accepting offline debit cards, the merchant who
244 As a
accepts an offline debit card bears the cost of the interchange fee.
result, a class action lawsuit, with plaintiffs such as Wal-mart, The Limited,
Sears, Safeway, Circuit City, the National Retail Federation and the International Mass Retailers Association, has been brought against Visa and
MasterCard alleging a violation of antitrust law by enforcing an illegal tying
arrangement.u The tying arrangement allegedly forces merchants to accept
2 46
cards.
offline debit cards as a condition to being able to accept credit
Because the average interchange cost for merchants to process offline debit
card transactions is much higher than a merchant's cost to process online debit

238.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

CARDTRAK ONLINE, MasterMoney Liability Reduced, July 31, 1997.
See Debit Cards: New Twists and Risks, BANK RATE MON1TOR, Sept. 5, 1997.
See generally Spurgin, supra note 227, at 18.
See generally id.; see also Balto, supra note 9, at 1096.
Spurgin,supra note 227, at 18.
See generally id.

244. Id. "Many retailers only make a few cents on the dollar after all expenses are paid.
It's not surprising then that they don't want to give one of those few cents to Visa for replacing
a paper check with a plastic one." Id.
245. Id. at 17. The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York on October 25, 1996. Id. at 18. Retailers claim to be paying hundreds of millions
of dollars in excessive interchange fees for accepting Visa and MasterCard brand offline debit
cards. Id. If a settlement agreement is not reached, trial is scheduled to begin in Spring 1999.
id. at 21.
246. Id. at 18.
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card transactions and checks, merchants that do not want to lose their ability
to accept credit cards claim that they have little choice but to accept offline
debit cards.247 Most importantly, with respect to damages, merchants claim
that interchange fees charged for debit card transactions, similar in amount to
those charged for credit card transactions, are not justified because offline
debit card transactions do not involve expenses similar to credit card
transactions.' These interchange fees are alleged to have already resulted in
billions of dollars of damages.249 Depending upon the outcome of this
litigation, if merchants are forced to accept offline debit cards and pay billions
of dollars in interchange fees, then this cost could ultimately be passed to
consumers through increased prices, notwithstanding a consumer's method of
payment.
CONCLUSION
Acknowledging that debit card fraud is relatively low, the critical
question is whether the EIFTA's existing liability protection against unauthorized EFIs is more beneficial to society than if amended. Without empirical
evidence, this is a difficult question to answer. At the time of writing this
comment, applicable provisions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999
appeared to provide the best solution because this legislation would simply
require an examination of whether the EFTA's current liability framework
provides consumers with adequate protection against unauthorized debit card
use.
If, on the other hand, if the EFTA is amended to limit a consumer's
liability to only $50 irrespective of when the consumer reports an unauthorized offline debit card transaction, then regardless of industry policies,
consumers may respond in a detrimental fashion by avoiding responsible
account maintenance and precautionary measures. Though the cost incurred
by consumers acting in this fashion could be absorbed by a financial
institution and then passed to all customers, the nominal amount distributed
should be considered as an aggregate value and balanced against protecting
consumers who negligently maintain debit card accounts. This consideration,
along with many others in the intricate world of payment law, must be

247. Id. 'The suit relates to four points: 1)the price is unfair; 2) the price is exorbitant;
3) most importantly, debit acceptance is tied to credit acceptance; and 4) this forced acceptance
results in billions of dollars in damages." Id.
248.

See id.

249. Id. at 19.
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assessed and reflected in any future amendments to the EFTA's liability
framework.
By passing legislation to amend the EFTA - in effect changing its
present liability framework to resemble that under the TILA - Congress will
provide no additional protection to responsible consumers who use offline
debit cards because the industry has already initiated liability allocation
measures in accordance with equity and reasonable consumer behavior
regarding debit card use, and thus, adequate safeguards against unauthorized
use are already in place. So long as industry standards remain sensitive to
legitimate consumer protection issues and the debit card market's profitability
remains sufficiently contingent upon providing consumers with reasonable
safety-oriented incentives to use offline debit cards as a payment method,
federal intervention is unnecessary. Therefore, the debit card should be
promoted by the federal government only to the extent that protecting the
consumer is truly justified and any enacted legislation should be in the best
interest of society as a whole.
DANIEL M. MROZ

